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ABSTRACT
In this thesis we are going to take the symbolic approach
to the understanding of Hong Kong po-litics. It is our basic
contention that a major part of our socio-political reality is
socially constructed and maintained. Political reality is
cued, reflected, evoked and comprehended through language and
symbols. Members of a political world reflect as well as build
up their political reality. But since a political reality is
socially constructed and maintained, it can be questioned,
challenged, destroyed and reconstructed, by employing a
different set of linguistic categorizations composed of
alternative symbols. Therefore every political reality is
inherently unstable and problematic, facing possible threat
from new definitions.
Hong Kong is regarded to have enjoyed a history of
comparative stability since the war. From this approach, the
phenomenal stability has been reflected in the convergence of
definitions of socio-political reality by the local governing
elites, the Chinese leaders and the people of Hong Kong. But
in the meantime we are said to be in a politicization towards
1997. Politicization here exactly indicates competitive
definitions unprecedent in Hong Kong of political reality and
futurity. He witness a series of definition struggles among
the Chinese Government. the British-Hong Kong Governments,
capitalists and a group of rising elites. Hhile the Hong Kong
Government has Secured a protracted period of Stable definition
situation in Hong Kong, the Chinese authorities and the rising
elites come up to be rival definers. -This thesis is especially
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11. INTRODUCTION--SYMBOLS AND POLITICAL REALITY
In the theory of social science there are two seemingly
opposed approaches to social reality. First there is the
subjective-understanding type as championed by Aeberi The
other can be called objective-explanatory type as advocated
by Durkheim? For Weber, the starting point of social
investigation must arrays be the meaning individuals attach to
in their social actions. A collective is no more than the
sum of each and every individual's want. interest, value and
motive. A reified collectivity cannot think, feel, perceive
only people can. To assume otherwise is to impute a spurious
reality to what are in effect conceptual abstraction.
Subjectivity is the path to social reality.
For Durkheim, in contrast, collective action is to be
explicable in terms of impositive social, objective lain
which is independent and above each and every individual's
want, interest, value and motive. In other words,
objectivity superimposes upon people of a society whether
they like it or not, or notice it or not. In this regard.
objectivity is the only road to reality. Subjectivity is
a no through way.
Berger tries to hold together these two divided positions
by his sociology of knoizledge. He provides an account of the
"constructed" process .Thereby a socio-political reality is
2fabricated. It is possible through social interactions. based
on individual subjectivity. That is. subjectivity can
construct reality. Political objectively is for the major
part a creation of inter-subjectivity.
He should do justice to Berger that he does not deny the
presence of social objectivity in Durkheimian sense.
Economic laws may impose upon us regardless of our individual
interest or intention. Social science is particularly geared
to the investigation of unintended consequence of our intended
action. Nevertheless, Berger emphatically draws our attention
to the constructed character of that human beings mean by
"reality" of many of our eoperiences.
According to his synthesizing approach, all individuals
inhabit a life-world, a total span of experiences
circumscribed by a natural environment, man-made objects,
events, and other people. A constructed reality within this
life-world is distinguished either by a purely subjective (eg
hallucination) or intersubjective (eg a market) enactment on
this world. It is a system of meanings either privately
constituted or publicly shared with others, regardless of its
ontological objectivity. But our life-world consists of
multiple provinces of realities--dreams, cinema, family,
economy, society, politics, etc--with separable clusters of
meaning. Different provinces of meaning may come congruent( a
certain family-type may render support to the stability of a
society) go violation (a polyarchica( political system vs. a
centralized economic system)? or go separation with minimun
3cross-boundary influence (when viewers return to their
modernized society after seeing a classical movie). It is from
this groundwork that students develop their concern with the
symbolic aspects of politics--to investigate the power of
symbols to define and shape political events, as well as to
allocate political interests.
Symbols and Politics
People tend to take language and symbols solely to
describe or reflect Facticity. But language and symbols may be
employed to construct reality and arouse emotion. He cannot
make sense of our world except by means of language, and we may
respond to this world in accordance with the sense we have
enacted upon it. Changes in our political values and conduct
bring forth new political language and symbols we experience
and utter. At the same time the change in political language
and symbols induce important shift in our political life and
thought.
Hhile ue feel to be imposed by the trorld re inhabit
(like our natural environment) regardless of our subjective
perceptions, a major part of our socio-political reality is
socially constructed and maintained. Political reality is cued.
reflected, evoked and comprehended through language and
symbols. Members of a political world reflect as ::ell as build
up their political reality. In the process of this
construction and reflection symbols are generated that become
part of the common currency they use in relating themelves to
others and to the external world. And symbols are popular in
politics chiefly because they are efficient tools in
communication and they are economical vehicles to carry complex
experiences. A political reality is socially constructed and
maintained therefore it can be questioned. destroyed and
reconstructed, by employing a different linguistic
categorisation composed of alternative set of symbols.
Therefore every political reality is inherently uncertain and
problematic, facing possible challenges from nen members of the
polity and from contacts and communication with other symbolic
systems.
A symbol is defined as any label to index meanings that
are not inherent in, nor discernible from. the label itself.
Symbol is not restricted to linguistic utterance in speech
forms and in black-and-white. It also refers to non-verbal
settings, language forms, media of communication, and so on.
Symbols may be subdivided into referential and
|o
condensational. Referential symbols or denotative symbols
are the most rudimentary symbols to designate physical objects,
concrete operations. and objective conditions. where the
meanings of the designated objects. operations or conditions
will be generally identified in the same way by different
people (at least within the same culture). Examples are sky.
rock, walking, voting, war, famine. etc.
Condensational symbols. on the other hand. transcend anv
concrete entity or objective situation. Thev summarise,
condense and evoke experiences. anxieties. pride. beliefs in
the past and faiths in the future. Examples are equality.
5"freedom. democracy." My Nation, stability, national
security, etc. Referential and condensational symbols are by
no means mutually eclusive. Election, for instance, may be
both denotative and connotative. Democracy stands for a
system of government as well as a political commitment. No
referential symbols can completely be free of condensational
spillover, a nd vice versa. That i s. there is no strict
referential/condensational symbols dichotomv. T nteraate. For
example, does not merely designate an apartment complex located
in Hashinaton. D. C., but also symbolizes political conspiracy
and national scandal.
Symbols sere importance social and political functions
because they unify as well as distinguish between people. Some
political symbols are enduring and powerful because they are
the focal points to index individual's experience and
expectation of a polity. Not only can they summarize people's
common history, more often they (mostly condensational symbols)
can also anchor their diverse emotions and anticipations.
People subscribe to the same symbol do not infer that they have
solid agreement at its substantive meaning. Although people of
common social and cultural experiences may share similarity in
receiving a symbol, there may be substantial difference in
concrete definition. But their attachment to the same symbol
links them to the larger political order, to synchronize their
diverse motivations. regularize the brand of politics and to
make collective actions possible. Symbols are cardinal to the
integration of a political community. China, for instance, is
a high-order symbol to constitute an abstract entity.
5"Ilationalicm then relate the "Chinese" members to their
political community. substantiating a feeling of social
cohesion and political identity.
On the other hand. symbols are effectively used to
differentiate. It is evident in the presence of
contradictory symbols within a pluralistic polity. In the
United States, for example. democracr is taken to be the
unifying symbol. But the polarity and fluctuation of values
summarized in symbols such as liberty vs equality.
"individualism" vs "egalitarianism," "interventionism" vs
isolationism." "coooeration" vs "competition," "justice" vs
"efficiency" permeate her domestic and foreign policies, making
"
distinctions between politicians and their supporters.
Symbols and Categorization.
Political gain is largely exercised through winning or
pressing for acceptance of an intricate problem of a particular
categorization In the face of competing efforts on behalf of a
12different one. Categorization by symbols is not simply an
instrument for describing events but itself a part of event
shaping their meanings. In symbolization, a certain aspect of
a situation or an object is summarily conceived, understood,
and communicated. Winning a definition game through symbols
adds up political potency not because the recognized
14
classification is necessarily or wholly correct or true.isis
The crux is by symbolizing in certain way instead of others. it
nramnts the target audience chat is the anpronriate action
7and behaviour to take with respect to that classification. It
is because a potent symbol exerts its vigor not on its own. It
evokes other related symbols to support itself. to infer
unnoticed assumptions. and to solicit unreflective prejudgment.
A symbol works in a context a powerful symbol works against a
provocative context--a culture, a current experience, or a
world trend. The symbolic naming on an issue as professional
or technical in character Justifies decision making by
"professionals." "technicians." and "exper"15 it also
simuItaneousl rejects the participation of laymen as
unprofessional and thus incompetent. And it is in an age
(context) of"rationalization" and professionalism that these
symbols fulfill themselves.
But each categorization is always one-dimensional in
perspective symbolization is only an abridgement. A symbol
highlights something to us at the same time it masks or
depreciates other things, implies certain taken-for-granted
assumptions, and projects unwarranted vision to the future. In
brief, it shapes what we see and what we do not see in the
world. Nevertheless to battle with competitive symbols may
serve only to polarize people who are so identified with their
own perception. Hon a phenomenon is symbolized involved
alternative scenarios, each with its own facts. value
16
judgments, emotions, and expectations. For example, symbols
like criminal, or drug addict drag our attention by the
prosecutor on the alleged weakness and pathology of the
individual, while his sympathizer would pardon him as social
victim. Both depictions may carry some truth and evidence. but
8to combat pith adversarial symbols only cloud the issue.
Symbols and Role-Taking
A drama requires actors as well as audience.
Receptivity of symbol rests on the beliefs and perceptions of
those iTho receive it. Hithout the role-takincr of the receiver,
an authorized :symbol may not be willingly accepted. Language
arousal is rooted in social role-taking mediated through the
17
individual'S socialization and experience17 Political
cognitions. which have a rather different epistemological
18
status from the knowledge of the hard sciences. is necessarily
an active, participatory process. Political perception
involves language, symbols, events ("realities") and self-
conception, mutually determining one another's meaning. In
Edelman's words, how political events are perceived defines
19
the observer as surely as he or she defines them. With
reference to the theory of social interactionism, he elaborates
this point:
Cognitions are complex because they are social in
character. not confined inside the head of a
single person. Language and gestures generate
shared meanings at the same time as they generate
a self. though recognition of the social basis
of individual cognition in no way denies
individuality. Class ties, group identifications.
reference groups. and other kinds of 20 significant
others help shape patterns of belief.
So most people perceive and believe as having been socialized
to perceive and believe. And they define people and situations
at the some time they participate in locating their selves.
Hhen we make our decision to Symbolize others in question.
there is a hidden implication in the S'mbolization cihich
9directs our attention to our own situation.21 To affirm that a
tear is Waged by those warmongers, or communist conspirators
of one's neighbouring nation is to identify one's own political
stance. To see a prisoner convicted of assault as a
psychopath is to reassure one' s own psychological posture at
least as firmly as one identifies that of the prisoner.
Preview
In this thesis Tie are going to take this symbolic
approach to the understanding of Hong Kong politics.- He
catalogue the common political symbols in Hong Kona according
to the scheme offered by Elder and Cobb. where popular examples
of symbolic objects that might be found are listed. The scheme
is arranged as a loosely hierarchical structure. On top of the
structure are symbols defining a political community. They are
more inclusive. fundamental and enduring in nature. They may
be regarded as residing on the main root of people's
political universe. At the bottom there are symbols defining
more specific, current and transient political actors,
authorities and policy issues. In the middle of the hierarchy
are symbols associated with political values, roles and
structures. Symbols in the middle and lower parts of the
hierarchy are by no means necessarily less salient. They may
acquire magic by being defined or associated with political
symbol higher above the structure. Nevertheless a low-ranking
symbot sowld d be demystified if it is deemed irrelevant or
contradictory to higher order symbols. The lower type of
svmbols alwavs succumb to the higher one
10
A Typology of Political Symbols in Hong Kong
Type of Political Symbols Example
Political Community Hong Kong, China, Special
A:d-ministrative Region
Political/Economic Ideologies, Socialism, Capitalism,
Values, Norms, Roles and Territorial Integrity,






Youde, Deng Xiaoping{ 1) Current Symbols
Xu Ji stun, New China News(2) Non-Goy: ernment Political
AgencyActors and Structures
(3) Policies and Policy Issues Housing, Broadcasting
Changes in our political perception bring forth new
political language and symbols. Alternatively, changes in our
political language and symbols induce important changes in our
political life and thought. In the meantime we are said to be
in a politicization period toward 1997. He take the symbolic
approach to Hong Kong since politicization here indicates
competitive definitions of political reality and futurity
unprecedented in Hong Kong. He witness a series of definition
struggles among the Chinese Government, the British-Hong Kong
Governments, capitalists and a group of rising elites. Rhile
the Hong Kong Government has enjoyed a period of stable
definition situation in Hong Kong, the Chinese Government and
the rising elites come up to be rival definers. This thesis is
especially to study the ways that the definition struggles have
been undertaking.
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In Chapter 3, we shall review the definition
confrontation between Britain and China, as precipitated by the
so-called 1997 issue. Rival definitions of reality raise the
question of their final resolution. Berger' s answer is that
he who has the bigger stick has the better chance of imposing
his definitions of reality. In this formulation, the actual
prevalence of a rival conception of reality depends less on
moral persuasion than on the conditions of resource control and
interdependence between the two definers. Hith a bigger
Stick.. China has come to impose her definition of reality
upon Hong Kong.
In Chapter 4, we shall consider a definition threat
as posed by a group of democratic advocates. Whilst
different groups of people will attach to and identify with
different symbols, the introduction of new symbols will foster
or intensify social differentiation. In that chapter we find
that the dominant symbol toward 1997 will be simplified by
prosperity and stability. But it face a cluster of symbols
with a different scenario summarized by democratization. The
latter re-arouse and triggers off a social differentiation.
Within the territory, vocal capitalists come to the front to
actively defend prosperity and stability. They regard
democratization as presenting a class threat. But they are
opposed by the new class who sees no incompatibility between
democracy and prosperity and stability.
In Chapter 5, we deliberate on the perspective of how
political symbols would bear on the political development in
12
Hong Kong. But we should in the first place set out the
dominant symbols under British administration in next chapter.
As tie shall see, the early Hong Kong Chinese' s political
symbolism was conditioned by their terrific experiences in
their motherland. The reality was dictated to them marked by
an uncertain future, resulting in political impotence and
escapism.
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2. SALIENT SYMBOLS IN HONG KONG--FROM 40s TO THE PRESENT
A. Hong Kong--From a Lifeboat to a Home
Hona Kong is a British dependent territory. But over 98%
of the total population are Chinese. Although the history of
the territory can be dated back* to the mid nineteenth century.
most of the Chinese moved to Hong Kona only after the Communist
takeover of Mainland China in 1949. He choose to set out the
salient symbols which started imposing themselves in 1940s when
a flux of Chinese refugees and immigrants fled their native
country to land on Hong Kong. Survival was the nucleus of
their symbolic system. This perception of reality still
lingers to the present but has since 60s been given way to
another system when the Hong Kong's economy began to grow.
Hong Kong as a Lifeboat
Historically a vast number of people came to settle in
Hong Kong who were not British colonists but Chinese refugees
and immigrants who took shelter here. Rather than colonized b :
the British they came here to subjugate themselves to foreign
rule. For political and economic reasons. most Chinese in Hong
Kong preferred to live outside at the communist- jurisdiction. Long
years of turbulence in China has made her an awful symbol it
embodied political instability and government intervention.
( China) stood for a neaati ve symbol of reference for
Dalu 大陸
Honer Kona peoole. Compared with the Communist China. Hong
iKong is a heaven. If you don' t like it here, go back to
2
'China' is a sophistic but powerful rebuttal to silence people
who were somehow dissatified with the local situation.
But ever since the founding of the People's Republic of
China , her rulers had stated that Hong Kong was part and
parcel of Chinese territory. She would take it back when the
time was ripe. This, adding to the geographical proximity
with China, implanted on the minds of Hong Kong Chinese
dependent and defeatist feelings. - The following metaphor was
often referred to condense ther local perception on the
relationship between Hong Kong and Communist China:
Hong Kong is a lifeboat; China is the sea. Those
who have climbed into the lifeboat naturally don' t
want to rock it?
The Government therefore habitually found it convenient to
provoke in people' s hearts the fear of the symbol China, so
as to fend off any uninvited disagreement to her ruling policy
or pressures for political reforms occasionally expressed
locally or in British Parliament. David Trench, a former
Governor, seriously described the perceived threat on every
nerve of the Government and the people:
Every single policy—social, political or economic
—is coloured by China's nearness. China's
attitudes, and the consequent difficulty of being
certain of an assured future...This situation
demands great realm in all our thinking. . . Hong
Kong cannot afford the luxury of making mistakes,
and particularly of well-meant mistakes, in any of
its policies.
At the same time, the symbol of China was perceived by
the British administration and Hong Kong Chinese to definitely
impose a temporality on their political reality. Since Hong
Kong was taken as a resting place than a permanent home, the
input demands of the population on the Government were
inhibited to a large extent. On the other hand, ruling under a
transient perspective of uncertainty, the British refused to
opt for an active role in development. The spectacular
economic growth that Honci Kong later achieved had never been
S
the original intention of the Government. To leave things as
they are was the auidance to government policies. The
Government shared it with the people that survival was the
name of the game. She came out with the image that the British
administrators and the Chinese people in Hong Kong were in the
same boat. rather than colonial overlords of the latter.
Phobia of Politics
Early Hong Kong Chinese painfully experienced famine and
civil wars caused by political struggles and turmoils. They
withdrew to Hong Kong exactly to avoid politics. Politics
was to be associated with instability, disorder and
bloodshed. They even evaded the use of the word politics or
political even when they were actually involved in such
activities by the Kestern perspective. As Hoadley put it:
In fact, most citizens involved in politics prefer
to call it by another name, for example, public
service or advisement or administration of local
affairs, reserving the term politics to describe
the polemics and civil war generated by the
struggle of the Kuomintang against the Communist
Party. This leads to the incongruity of a man
running for election to the urban Council writina
into his platform the desire to keep politics out
of Hong Kong.
In a survey in 1974. it was found that most respondents were
1
affectively attached to the symbol of social stability. Co
16
they would tend to resign from any activities that would be
categorized or perceived as political, as politics was the
antonymous symbol of stability.
This one-dimensional view on politics was well accepted
8
and protected by the Hong Kong Government8. Although there were
certainly a great deal. of political activities in her Crown
homeland and even in so small a city as Hong Kong, the
Government and the ruling elitelite appeared to agree with the
people that politics was a "noisy", "nasty", "dirty",
"unpleasant", and necessarily. violent form of activity
leading to fights and :gars. The Government was alert to
avoid the label of politics to depict their colonial
administration. From the mouth of a member of the Legislative
Council:
9
In Hong Kong we do not want politics of any kind.
In their study of political orientations of Hona Kong Chinese,
Shively and Shively caught their over-sensitiveness in
responding to political questions:
The obvious apprehension of the respondents and
their refusal to answer direct political questions
was understandably due not only to the fact that
the Chinese in Hong Kong are British subjects, but
that they are caught in an ideological fend
between the People's Republic of China and the
10
government of Taiwan.
Hong Kong as a Home
As mentioned, survival politics was mutually defined by
the Government and the people of Hong Kona at the early staae.
There was no concern for governing legitimacy at a higher
principle level. The prime attention was to make sure that the
17
maintainability of the symbol of social stability. as not
seriously doubted. But the 1966 riot epitomised a changing
definition of the socia-political reality in Hong Kong.
especially by the younger generation. The binding strength of
the symbolic system since 1940s, though still dominant, was
undergoing significant amendments and qualifications.
First, for the people the--conceived threat from China' s
arbitrary interference has been lessened. especially for the
younger generation who did not have those horrible experiences
in Mainland China as their parents. In addition. records of
China' s self-restraint- and tolerance to the status quo as
well as the awareness of Hong Kong's economic contributions to
China underlie this more optimistic view. All these have
enlightened the Hong Kona Chinese that to confront the
Government with more social demands would not necessarily
provoke intense reactions from China. So long as they do not
demand radical change or an autonomous status of Hong Kona,
China would keep her hands out of Hong Kong. The PRC has an
economic stake in Hong Kong. It is especially the case when
she began to adopt a more pragmatic policy of Four
Modernization under the leadership of Deng Xiaopina, who has
then been visualized as the symbol of pragmatism and
stability. Local political activists interpret that there is
a lot of room to maneuver in domestic affairs only if they do
not trespass on issues of constitutional change and political
independence. As since 1970s we have seen a growing number of
pressure groups which are more projective to confront the
Government. without fear of provoking China' s intervention by
18
"mistake.
Second, although the emergence of a clear, independent
political identity with Hong Kong is out of place, since the
1960s and 70s there has been a growing proportion of the
population who think of Hong Kong as a more stable home than
a momentary refugee camp. They have no noticeable desire to
resettle in China. In a recent opinion surrey 89 o of
the respondents regarded Hong Kong as home. One more
indication is that people rank housing as an issue they are
12
most concerned about. Hhile the people generally value the
part played by the Government in housing, they expect her to
do more.
B. Chinese Symbolic Heritage and Hestern Influences
He noted above the immediate past experiences of the Hong
Kong Chinese had moulded their reactions to some politcal
symbols. But it is also possible to look for a more general
explanation in their cultural heritage. Special attention will
be directed to the harmonious and subservient nature of Chinese
traditional value system. Especially during the early period
the mentality of Hong Kong Chinese were still heavily
influenced by traditional Chinese cultural values. norms, and
morality. But they have, been confronted by Hestern culture
under British administration since the post-war period.
Consequently. some Chinese values have been intensified. some
eroded. The Hong Kong Man that emerges is the extraordinary
blend of the Chinese and Western cultural systems.
Premise on Physical Nature
From its inception, the Chinese culture invited the belief
that the universe was a cyclical regularity involving two
bipolar phenomena or processes--arowth and decay. up and down,
hot and cold. day and night. waxing and waning of the moon.
This universal regularity is not subject to change through
human' s effort. The Teo-the Lau of Nature-is an almighty force
imposing on us. From this perspective. our basic relation with
the physical nature is one of submission, tolerance-ti and
adaptation, in order to secure harmony with the Tao.
Premise on the Nature of Society
The cultural conceptions of Chinese people support a
peculiarly familial constitution of society. The family was a
salient feature of society for two millennia. Besides as an
economic unit, the family is the centre of social relationships
and the sphere in which man's moral duties are performed. In
Imperial China the teachings of Confucius dominated the values
and customs of 'the people. I n his moral tenets Confucius
emphasized the centrality of family relationships. He
categorized five fundamental social relationships: between
sovereign and minister, father and son, elder and younger
brothers. husband and wife. and between friends. Three of
which occur within the family. Of all relationships. Confucius
appreciated peaceful coexistence, mutual assistance.
respect" and "loyalty". and to depise "quarrel", "struagle"
competition, adversary, and confrontation. In Hong Konc
the low rate of uA'onization has reflected the proclivity of
earl Hong Kong Chinese to evade direct confrontation with
their employers and the authorities. Workers generally prefer
to switch jobs to improve their working conditions instead of
collective bargaining.
Premise on Life Values
Following the last premise, personal life values of
Chinese people were bound with the family, in the forms of
materialistic and status acquisitions. But the former was
traditionally deemphasized in the hierarchy of life values.
ii
especially for the gentry class. Nevertheless, traditional
Chinese philosophy as a whole recognised and sympathized that
material pursuit among the common people was necessary since it
was the means by which family members were provided food and
5101 163011 1165 51:3(36 01 (settlina down a
family and making a good living). The limit is that economic
accumulation should not be excessive beyond the satisfaction of
it
r w ta q H c
But China had been exposed to Hestern influence since the
gap]_ y 19th century, especially along coastal port cities.
hannhai were two renowned trading ports with the
Hest. Industrial and trading activities came to be accepted as
a worthwhile pursuit. Industrial and commercial classes
emerged and were less constrained by traditional values. Among
those Chinese refugees and immigrants who fled to Hong Kong.
21
many of them were industrial and commerical elites in Canton
18
and Shanghai. They departed from their motherland to secure
and improve their wealth and economic positions. As time went
on. they came to be less attached to the dangers of wealth
acquisition.
Premise on the Roles of the Government, of People, and on the
Ideal Relationship between Them
Chinese philosophy of submission. tolerance and
adaptation with respect to the relation with the physical
nature also spread to the political aspect. Political .Tas the
business of the mandarin, the scholar and the gentry. Subjects
were not expected to comprehend the functioning and business of
otheir government. Obedience, self-control, and conflict-
avoidance with the official were the norms for Chinese
subjects. Opposition was to be minimized. The relationship
between the prince and his subject was one of caring and
servility. Individuals, in relation to the emperor who was
regarded as the Son of Heaven, were cast impotent with
respect to his command.
This cultural trait is generally taken to account for the
apathy of Chinese pea pl e. But historically Chinese had a
record of social unrest against the ruling regime which was
interpreted as losing its mandate delegated from the
Heaven. is As Meadows. an early European writers on Chinese
history. remarked:
Of all nations that have attained a certain degree
of civilization. the Chinese are the least
22
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revolutionary and the most rebellious.
At any rate, it can be said that Chinese people demonstrated a
high degree of tolerance toward despotic rule- Rebellion was
taken when the ruler was interpreted to have acted against the
Lax of Nature. Hong Kong Chinese, living under a so-called
benevolent monarch, have generally been applauded for their
law-abiding and cooperative attitudes to the colonial
admi ni strati on.
Hestern Influence and the Emergence of Hong Kong Man
The late 60s and the early 70s visualized the rapid
industrialization of Hong Kong. Both industry and commerce
marked a take-off point, and the wages of the average Hong Kong
Chinese and the living standard began to jump up, which in turn
started to promote their consumption ability. To meet the
demand for industrialization the Government began to engage
herself in massive infrastructure building (urbanization,
development and reclamation of land, construction of road
network and communication system). At the same time. Western
popular cuture began to appear in cinema and other mass media.
All these carried immense impact on traditional Chinese values
and brought incipient government's response.
First of all, the Western idea of Progress that man
could and should manipulate or control forces and environment
bectan to exert on the minds of the people. in such a densely
populated area needing development, exploitation is as much
important as adaptation. Roads. bridaes. the Cross-Harhour
23
Tunnel. the mass Transit Railways, and other enactments on the
environment are generally accepted and welcomed by the local
23
people.
Second, the liberated environment of Hong Kong has
provided the Cantonese and Shanghainese enterpreneurs to fully
express their:: eal th-acquisition potential. They establish and
enlarge the manufacturing industries which are the lifeblood of
Hong Kong economy. Their materialistic value is shared by
their employees who work as hard as. possible to cater for their
families. Symbols of it "prosperity" and it progress win more
commitment from local population.
But as the Hong Kong society is becoming better educated,
the people (particularly the young) are more concerned and more
articulate about what they seek from the Government. The
Government, on the other hand, is aware of the people' s
changing perceptions. This has pushed the Government to play a
more interventionist role in the life of Hong Kong people. She
has adopted a more "grass-rooted" approach in order to be more
convergent with this shift in people's a expectation.24 Having the
1966 riot as a lesson. she has learnt to preempt many potential
social conflicts.
Nevertheless, a more grass-rooted approach in social and
economic policies has not been paralleled by a more populist
16
orientation in politics until very recently. The Colonial
Government has been too conveniently and willing to assume the
role of a paternalistic ruler to which the Chinese mere
24
accustomed to. Power is heavily concentrated in the hands of
the Governor, a Huanct Di( emperor) who speaks English, with the
intimate and close advice by the Executive and Legislative
Councils. The paternalistic mode of governance was most
conspicuous in the New Teritories, where the district officers
were likened to imperial officals of the Chinq dynasty as
£u-mu-kuan( father-mother-officers). In the urban areas.
the Government adopts a more impersonal, bureaucratic rule.
She has been highly cautious not to instigate in the people' s
minds the desire and values of popular participation, thus
making herself legitimate by modelling her institutions and
attitudes on the paternalistic line to which the Chinese have
been accustomed to.
To compensate, materialistic pursuits seem to be the
alternative life-meaning for the people. Economism and
consumerism prevail. As Ching makes this connection when he
says:
Over 100 years, all political power resided with
the British. Hong Kong people, denied a
significant role in the ruling of their own
affairs, channeled their energies into other
activities, the most popular of ghich was making
money.2$
The Government has also reinforecd the significance of wealth
by according it with status value. Chinese millionaires and
billionaires have been invited to the upper status echelon--to
sit on various prestigious government councils and committees,
to be looked upon for leadership in Chinese community





Harmony, peace, law and order, and consensus are
positive symbols in Chinese culture. On the other hand,
division,
"adversary," "controversy," "disintegration," and
confrontation arouse uneasy feelings. As a result, political
measures being associated to the former range of symbols are to
be welcomed, but every effort has to be made to avoid or even
ban activities branded as "conflictual" and "divisional".
Political party or "faction." for instance, is a symbol
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conjured up with conspiracy to disrupt harmony and order.
On the other hand. the tendency for the Government to have
argued e :cessively on the line of "government by consensus"
have not invited negative reactions from the Chinese
population, not least because it fit the Chinese traditional
harmonious values. In the economy, on the other hand, the
Government chooses to define it as a classical liberal,
"competitive" type. So two divergent symbolic definitions
attend to political and economical realms. The former is said
to run according to "consensus" and "stability", but at the
same time classical liberal ideas of perfect competition,
struggle, and progress pervade the latter province.
However, consensus politics is merely a disguised symbol for
monolithic governance. The political arena is not really
consensual as the economic sphere is neither wholly
competitive. it is those democratic elites Tie shall
deliberate in Chapter 4 who want to infiltrate competitive
elements to the political system. But their emergence is
hardly possible without the so-called "1997" issue.
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J. THE 1997 ISSUE--SYMBOLS AND CONFLICT DEFINITION
The status of Hong Kona as a British colony was
established by three treaties in the- 19th century. Since her
foundation in 1949. the attitude and position of the People' S
Republic of China toward Hong Kong has been one of ambivalence
and flexibility. On the one hand. Hong Kong is part and parcel
of Chinese territory under the symbolic expressions of
national independence and territorial integrity. The
colonial status of Hong Kona is the result of a series of
unequal treaties which the imperialists imposed on China.
Hong Kona is a symbol of China' s exploitation and humiliation
at the hands of the Rest. On the other hand, the Chinese
authorities has long recognized the economic values she
acquires from Hong Kong (regrettably under the British rule).
The compromise of these two positions was to postpone the
settlement date. The resolution was insisted to be entirely
within China's sovereign right --to exercise whatever
definition at the time she would dish to define.
He !Tho has the bigger stick has the better chance of
imposing his definition of reality. The submissive mentality
of the Hong Kong Chinese has rendered themselves impotent in
defining their situation. The reality they have been living
with was one historically superimposed upon them. one that they
had little Poiler. if any, to re-define. Since the definition
of reality was not of their on choice and they felt unable to
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re-define, the consequent attitude was a kind of escapism--to
postpone the deadline as late as possible.
Decades of economic development has established Hong
Kong as a commercialized city. moulding the people into
economic men. In a political lifeboat, the lack of any
articulated political goals means that economic pursuits become
the goal. Homo economicus is a. better identity than refugee
or immigrant, and is surely better than having none. For
Hong Kona men there is an abyss between the world of today and
that of the past, and between an economic man and a Chinese
refugee. So they preferred to reject, consciously or
subconsciously, the relevance of history to the determination
of Hona Kong' s future at the initial stage of the Sino-British
negotiation.
This urge to redefine Hong Kong's future in terms of
economism was certainly welcomed and supported by Mrs Thatcher
and Hong Kong Government. It was exemplified by a senior local
government offical when asked about the implications of the
1997 deadline. he (she?) responded: 1997? That's a very un-
Hona Kona question to ask. No one here worries about it. To
the British side, economic prosperity and social stability
founded upon the status quo was all that mattered. And
status quo was defined as the retention of British
presenCe. Prosperity and stability was categorically linked
with British presence. During her visit to China in September
1982. Mrs Thatcher maintained that the treaties concerned could
be varied but not nullified, adding that people .rho did not
honour one treaty would not honour another. She also reassured
that British had clear responsibility, moral duty and
commitment to Hong Kong people—which Has taken as a hint
that she would strive for a British continued presence in Honq
Kong after 1997.
The contention over whose symbolic definition would
prevail was a crucial part of the conflict and bargaining
between China and Britain. China came up to a rival definition
of reality on Hong Kong. And symbols played a major role in
this dynamic political antagonism. She firmly rejected any
4
British moral responsibility and commitment to Hong Kong
people, pouring out symbols like nationalise, territorial
integrity, reunification to the motherland etc through the
mass media. She tried to re-arouse Hong Kong Chinese national
feeling and arrest their am bi vaUnt political attitude towards
Chinese Communist Party and China as such. Deng responded
why he could not just maintain the status quo of Hong Kong by
saying: If I agree to prolong the lease, I will become the
second Li Hongzhang, where Li is symbolized in Chinese history
as a national traitor during the Ching dynasty.
Chinas Sovereignty and One Country, Two Systems
The basic tactics of the Chinese leaders were first of all
to project their image as China to the local Chinese instead
of as the Chinese Communist Party. Hould you like the PRC to
claim back Hong Kong was turned into Should China have
sovereignty over Hong Kong .
The PRC s nationalistic symbols have both mobilization and
quiescence effects, depending on target audience. On the one
hand they have arousal ramifications on pro-Chinese agencies
and persons, as well as a significant number of wel1—educated.
articulate young people who are critical of the colonial
7
government. Nationalism is even the foundation principle of
2
some rising political groups (e.g. the Meeting Point) and
occasional referent of student unions in the tertiary education
institutions. For the latter, their political platforms on the
future of Hong Kong converge on that sovereignty over Hong kong
7
categorically belongs to China. But for the general public,
they are not party s compatriots who can be rampantly won over
by the Chinese communist. A series of socio-political movements
after the founding of the communist regime and the experience
of the 1967s bombing riot as a spillover of the Cultural
Revolution have alienated local Chinese. Moreover, the
normative and behavioural tendency of an average Hong Kong
Chinese to place his or her familial interests above the
interests of society or any of its component individuals and
groups cast doubts on the mobilization appeal of Chinese
nationalism. The realistic political culture of Hong kong
Chinese tends to shield themselves from ideological and
nat-.i nnal i stic appeals. In Lau' s words:
In a minimally-integrated social-political system,
it would be difficult for social issues to be
converted into political issues, for want of the
necessary conversion mechanisms.... The lack of a
dominant ideology, be it nationalism, communism,
ethnicism, regionalism, anarchism. or
developmentalism. is another depoliticizing
influence, and it in turn reinforces the pragmatic
instrumentalism which informs both the government
nnri the [Honcj Koncrl Chinese people.
But this may be only half of the story. Undoubtedly,
w
dominant ideology is absent in Hong.-Kong—nationalism is of
no exception. There are no xenophobia against a foreign state
12-
as such. In spite of this, China or Chinese, however vague
and unclear in the mind of the Hong Kong people, is still a
latent emotional and identity symbol. In the Hona Kona
Observers' poll, 61% of the respondents regard they are
?
Chinese. In Hong Kona, four out of five have relatives or
friends in Mainland China. Local Chinese with no leftist
linkage show open pride in the achievement and progress of
their motherland. This fair amount of emotive and identity
attachment to China is politically adequate for the PRC's
tactics.
Elder and Cobb call our attention to various forms of
1fe
symbolic attachment in political orientation. These general
patterns result from differences among people in the intensity
of their sentiment toward a symbol and in the richness,
specificity and clarity of the substantive meaning they
attribute to it. He then differentiate between high affect
rrnm those with little affective feelings towards the symbol
and juxtapose them with relatively well developed substantive
orientation and with diffuse or inchoate one. From this we
then have four orientation configurations. Each of these
combinations marks a predominant set of symbolic attachments
and is likely to be associated with a distinctive pattern of
behaviour with respect to the symbol.
Modes of Symbolic Attachment

















Ideologues are persons Kith both high affective and
substantive understanding of the symbol involved. For such
persons, behaviour associated with the symbol Kill be
existential, marked by personal self-expression and personality
development. In contrast, people Khose orientations towards a
symbol are devoid of both affect and cognitive contents are
apathetic, fatalistic. suspicious, or alienated from
the symbol! He can also distinguish a diffuse-pragmatic
attachment where a person bears thin understanding and low
affection to a symbol but employs it for pragmatic interest.
Political realists and substantive pragmatists are
people who are affectively neutral but cognitively nell-
1specified to the symbol. Reactive or sympathetic attachment i;
Tor persons who lack substantive understanding but are high ii
yo
affect. Persons of this sort are typically reactors. '
followers or sympathizers, highly susceptible to evocation.
People may shift among these four symbolic attachments and
exhibit different patterns of behaviour with respect to
different symbols encountered. A person may, writes Elder et
al. be ideological in his orientations toward some symbols.
pragmatic with respect to others, and reactive or even an alien
with respect to yet others. A direct clash of diverse symbolic
attachments corresponding to different symbols may spark off
embarrassment, ambivalence and even existential crisis.
The symbolic attachments of the local Chinese at large
(who first wanted to maintain the status quo) toward the
communist regime could be described as diffuse pragmatic at
ja.
best. apathetic, alienated and suspicious at worst. But
the symbol of Chinese sovereignty attracted their sympathetic
sentiments. So they were caught in a symbolic dilemma. On the
one hand. playing the role of Chinese, local people were
chargeable by a fair amount of national sentiment. But this
patriotic feeling should never be exaggerated. Being economic
men afraid of the communist, they hoped for a non-
interruption of the present lifestyle and standard of livings.
Their ambivalence and embarrassment were tactfully arrested by
the Communist authorities with their united front strategy.
Ideologues were not necessary, but the PRC needed enough
sympathizers to her symbols.
The nationalist symbols, instead of mobilizing the Hong
Kong Chinese, was to preempt, defuse, quieten and neutralize
their inner hopes of sticking to their economic definition.
In this way, the PRC effectively.prevented the formation of any
kind of solidarity among the local people to try to influence
their oun fates. A revision of history served to remind and
refresh their nationalistic reality. Around the heated
fourth session of Sino-British talks in late September 1983,
the Chinese authorities produced The Burning of the Summer
Palace featuring an Anglo-French expeditionary force advancing
on Peking from Tianjin in 1860 to urge ratification of the
treaty that ceded Kowloon Peninsula to Britain.
Nith waving her nationalistic brand of stick, the PRC
leaders did not forget to feed Hong Kong people with some
carrot symbols, especially to the capitalist. Ideas of one
country, two systems, Hong Kong as a Special Administrative
Region, recover sovereignty, maintain prosperity, self-
admi ni stra ti on. Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong, without
change in fifty years, and high degree of autonomy were
promulgated to draw local support. For Chinese authorities,
prosperity and stability meant the smooth transference of
sovereignty to China together with the maintenance of the
present social and economic order. These various symbolic
expressions had more consolation appeal si nee they were seen to
have more realistic and practicable senses, especially at
the initialling of the Joint Declaration.
Conclusion and Preview
0
China and Britain commenced their talks with different
understanding and expectation on prosperity and stability. As
we have mentioned, the spectacular economic development that
Hong Kong has achieved since the post-war period was never once
the planned and intended result of the Government. But when
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and stability the achievements that had been made as under i
historical British rule. they tried to define that the lattei
was a necessary condition for the former and thus to lenc
legitimacy to the Hong Kong Government. The Chinese
Government. on the other hand, disjointed the linkage. She
defined that prosperity and stability could be also
maintainable by Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong and
under Chinese sovereignty. Britain later switched her
position to converge with China's definition, maintaining that
the JD is an internationally lecrally-binding document upon
the British and the Chinese authorities. The net effect of the
bombardment of the PRC's rhetoric was one of reinforcing
political impotence and helplessness among the local
.. _• j_ _ — .O •( m 4- V r-v -i y rlnnni' U5 f i nn
to define and re-define their reality thev would like to live-
in. And only those who can afford may emigrate--to re-define
their reality elsewhere. But in next chapter we see an
emergence of a new class which tries to re—establish a
definition power based upon the core symbol of democracy.
They are uttering a new speech which is different from that of
i-hp traditional commonplace in Hong Kona, and they manifest a
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new political culture woven with more activism and idealism.
But not incidental, their recalcitrant symbols intensify a
social differentiation.
36
1. DEMOCRATIZATION VS PROSPERITY AND STABILITY--SYMBOLS AND
SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION
Rhile Hong Kong is not a democracy, she is broadly
governed by liberal values. Generally speaking, the people
enjoy economic freedom, freedom of speech, equality before the
law, freedom of movement and so on. A union of these two
situations has made Hong Kong bear close realization to the
bourgeoisie ideals in Hestern classical liberal ideology.
Although nowadays we tend to think liberalism together
with democracy, early liberal thought was non-democratic, if
not anti-democratic, in character. Hestern liberal democratic
1
society was liberal long before it was democratic. The
earliest stage of liberalism( classical liberalism) was indeed
an ideology of the propertied class (as against the monarchical
absolutism). Classical liberals (bourgeoisies) argued that
ruling power ought to be wielded by those who owned property
and those who, through their own ingenuity and hard work, had
demonstrated their superior capacity for management and
government. The symbol democracy, as seen by the upper
layers of the class-divided society in the 17th century, meant
rule by the strong class. It advanced a class threat. Hence
classical liberalism excluded a large number of non-propertied
and lower class individuals from political participation. They
were "people "but not full "eitizens."
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In Hong Kong's colonial version, political power has been
2
monopolized by bureaucrats joined, by those-wealthy class. Due
to the feature above, classical liberalism is a poor candidate
as an integrative ideology, since it excludes a large number of
the population from the political realm. (It is one of the
reasons that Hong Kong has been described as a loosely-
integrated polity, despite the amount of freedom the people
can enjoy.) "Liberalism" has to be anchored with "democracy" to
be cohesive. As an effect of the 1997 issue, we witness a
substantive number of new elites. Their mission is exactly to
try to embody the future political institutions with
democratic credits. They speak a neat political language and
symbols like political accountability, return the
sovereignty to the people. direct election, separation of
power, 11 check and balance, etc. With a different symbolic
systems they constitute a divergent perception of political
futurity from the past. For them. democratization is the
only key to guarantee the continual enjoyment of those liberal
values we are tasting.
But democratization re-arouses class consciousness and
intensifies social differentiation. The capitialist stratum
takes it as imposing a class intimidation. It reiterates the
all-importance of "prosperity and stability," with which they
think democracy" would directly clash. It stresses the
continuation of the existing political institutions (which may
have the democratic flavour) that have served Hona Konct well.
Class Prior to the 1997 Issue
Before the 1 997 issue, class, though divisional, was not
a symbol standing for antagonism and conflict. Some
analysts even argued that the 1970s marked the end of class
ideology:
If the riot of 1 967 could be regarded as a major
class confrontation between the capitalist class
and the Colonial government on the one side and
working class led by the left-wing unions on the
other, it would be the last of its kind in the
history of Hong Kong. For the bases no longer
exist for working class solidarity.
4
Antagonism between classes waned partly because each has
profited and has been satisfied more or less with the economic
achievement of the postwar period, and subsequently with the
pragmatic performance of the Government.
Saston differentiates between diffuse support and
4
specific support for a political system. The former is
characterized by a relatively stable set of predisposition
2- i j. rA Pnr m r-v P omnH 10 3 i f a n h mp n t c nrJ
i p-; naH rmo tHt-h thp symbols of the political
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evpm In contrast the latter is contingent upon pragmatic
accounting of the system's performance in comparison to one s
performance expectation. The difference between the two is
that a political system endowed with diffuse support can better
withstand momentary fluctuations in specific support. A stable
system, from this perspective, is thereby definable by a more
or less unconditional and reliable reservoir of diffuse and
affective legitimacy that serves to cushion transitor
fluctuations in specific support1 In Hong Kong, diffuse
support has always been an anomaly to the Government. The
legitimacy of the Government did not depend on some
indisputable, transcendental kinds of norms—be it a moral
principle, a religious percept, a philosophical tenet, or an
ideology. Deprived of moral reference, the Government has been
completely secularized and established her legitimacy
whol1y through the securing of pragmatic and material benefits.
Momentary fluctuations in specific support (driver at the taxi
incident in 1983 went to the local office of the NCNA) or%
pieces of scandals (the Government invested surplus revenue in
London to the advantage of Britain) called back the basic
affective distrust towards the Colonial regime. This is why
always Hong Kong has been politically oversensitive, despite
g
its celebrity for alleged stability.
Fortunately, the general affluence that the local
Chinese enjoyed during the past few decade, especially in
comparison with their Mainland counterparts, has invited their
specific support. A steadily growing consumption of goods and
services, necessary for a capitalist economy for further
expansion, is encouraged by consumerism which is not
questioned by the majority of the people. They shon
acceptance, acquiescence or indifference to the Colonial
Government and class difference, so long as the Government Has
perceived to maintain pragmatic contribution to their daily
life. Furthermore. their satisfaction obtained from the
political system is simplified and condensed by prosperity and
stability. nhich becomes a symbolic source of diffuse support.
As Merelman suggests, while the initial legitimacy of a
political system may hinge upon the allocation of concrete and
specific interests, the satisfactions that accrue are
reinforced and secured through symbols. Over time, the symbol
of prosperity and stability develops itself into an
alternative basis of legitimacy in Hong Kong, a substitute
source of gratification and satisfaction, and eventually
becomes a catchword in social political conversations and
debates. It remains the lone sacred, emotive, shared symbols
w
for the Government and the people.
Second, the common subscription to market mechanism and
rationalization principle as promoted and mediated by the
Government has resulted in a convergent defintion of reality
among the bureaucracy, the capitalist and the people at large.
As registered above, the legitimacy of the Colonial
Government was a secularized version, deficient in any unifying
ideology. But the administerization of politics has
culminated itself into a rationalization principle as a
replacement. Market principle, productivity, efficiency,
effectiveness, technicalism, formalism and legalism, law
and order, rule by law, guardian of common interest have
stationed as the apppealing symbols. As Lau put it.
For a government that is colonial in constitution
and can command only limited moral authority and
political trust, it is advantageous to appeal
to. .. market criteria to justify many of its
actions and, deliberately or inadvertently, to
endow them with moral authority. The supremacy or
market rationality in the social structure is
reflected, for instance, in the popular perception
of class relationships. The existing income
inequality in Hong Kong is commonly explained and
accordingly rationalized—as a product of the
market economy, and hence as natural. . . . Hhen
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class structure is conceived primarily in market
terms. the degree of moral legitimacy that will
make it sacrosanct is, of course, absent. Still,
enough of it exists to imbue it with a quantum of
acceptability.
Class conflicts have also been ameliorated by the opportunities
for upward mobility was perceived as high. In a survey
conducted in 1977. the majority of the respondents agreed with
the statement: Hong Kong society is divided into two classes
of people, the rich and the poor. But 70% of the interviewed
shared the belief that there is always the chance of improving
one's status if one has the ability and initiative and if one
W-.
works hard enough.
But the most important, an absence of a political market
preempted the opportunity of class- conflict. Hestern
democratic theorists since the late 18th century were engaged
b one fundamental problem: How to fit democracy of one man
y
vote into a class-divided society? That is, how to
one
compromise egalitarian principle with an unequal society?
liberalism was a theory of concern with the pursuit
Classical
tY but not of equality. It was an ideology to lend
of ++liber,
the movement to enlarge and protect the liberties
support to
first of nobles and then a merchant middle class. incorporating
of so doing constitutional restrictions on the
as a means
overnment.1' Symbols of liberty and
prerogatives of g
++ were conceived to be utterly incompatible.
qualit
Y +l associated with popular rule was not legitimately
Equality ass o
established.
Hong Kong did not have to solve this thorny probler
before. The Government simply prevented the emergence of this
trouble once happened in the history of Western democracy. But
«
the contradiction between democracy and a class society is
brought to the surface by the 1997 issue.
First, the future issue brought about a complete breakdown
of the democratic rhetoric, by which it was claimed that the
Hong Kong Government and the ruling elite were the
representatives of the total population. Their
representative image was mercilessly smashed by the PRC' s
«
open rebuttal and British Members of Parliament's cynicism.
Hhen Sir Edward, the Governor of Hong Kong, once declared in
July 1993 during the bargaining period that he represented
Hong Kong and its people, the PRC's officials quickly rectified
that he was only an individual member of the British
delegation. Instead, Beijing alone could represent the
a
interests of the compatriots in Hong Kong. Taking it as a
valuable lesson, Sir S Y Chung, the Senior Unofficial Member of
the Executive Council, spoke to journalists that he could not
represent Hong Kong citizens as he was not elected by them.
Humbly he added he was only able to reflect the views of Hong
Kong citizens. Later, before the announcement of the
Agreementy, unofficial members of the Executive Council, led by
Sir S.Y. , flew to London to make the final appeal and to
reflect people's views and concerns. But still, they were
repeatedly snubbed for not being ' representatives' of the Hong
Kong people since they were not elected.
oecond, after two years of strenuous talks between the
Governments of the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of
China, the resolution of the future issue was finally concluded
in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, initialed on September
26. 1 984. According to the Agreement, sovereignty over Honcr
Kong will be recovered by China, but it will become a Special
Administrative Region (SAR) enjoying a high degree of
autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs. In the
political aspect, the Government of the PRC has earlier
endorsed the concept of Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong to be
implemented, which is generally interpreted by the rising
elites as symbolizing Hestern democracv. one-man-one-vote
system. But at the same time. Hong Kong will continue to
maintain its present capitialist economic system for another
50 years after 1997, as a realization of the PRC's formula of
One Country, Two Systems. This has reassured the local
i
capitalist that there would not be substantive change in Hong
Kong Thus while the new elites want to take this long-awaited
historic opportunity to democratize the political sphere,
capitalists sticks to the monopolized style. Hhen the new
ai i t-p? rr nt- fn introduce competitive politics consistently
coexisted with a relatively competitive economy,
enterpreneurs insist to set them apart (separated provinces of
meaning). It is a definition struggle between the capitialist
class and a new class which argues that only a democratic
government constituted by direct election is the only means
authoritatively enough to define our futurity.
Capitalist Class
The accentuation of class consciousness among capitalists
has turned sharp since the Government proposed to develop a
representative government in 1985. A salaried staff of an
industrial organization was deprived of election riahts by his
ell-to-do employers in the respective functional constituency.
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and was later sacked. Active members of the upper class come
to deplore the general passivity of their stratum when compared
with the arassroot and professional sectors. and they are very
anxious to encourage other members to pay more attention and
voice their opinion to the political development in Hong Kong.
The capitalist is adamant to the claim that prosperity
and stability would be threatened by democracy. Some of them
even speak openly in favour of a future political system which
would preserve the right of the few to govern the territory.
Defending a system of benevolent oligarchy. Lord Kadoorie
insisted that the people who govern Hongkong should be chosen
from those members of the community who created the
prosperity. He further compared that the running of a
government bore no major1 difference with the management of a
nnrnnmti on
All Honakona is one big business and it must have
a aood management and a well chosen board of
nor» f nPC
This kind of superior mentality is shared by members of the
same class They prefer the present nomination consultation
appointment system which excludes a majority of the population.
Underlying their worries is the basic distrust to the Hong
Kona people at large:
Hong Kong people might not be able to choose tY
right person C Chief Executive] when they are stil
political immature, while we can be more certai
of getting the right candidate through
nominating process.
Hong Kong people is thus suddenly conjured up with the
poor, the greedy, the freelunchers, the foolish, the
irrational, the incompetent, and the violent, when not
long ago Hong Kong people was an honoured label for
intelligence, hard work, resourcefulness, and
imagination. Hong Kong people falls into an object of
contradictory beliefs and perceptions. The upper class
conveniently evokes the array of descriptive symbols when it is
needed, but to disband it completely by another when it is not
suitable.
The Nature of the New Class
The secluded politics featuring the relationship between
the Government and the people has failed to create symbolic
gratification around the political insitutions. The new class
is dissatisfied with the continuation of this phenomenon and
struggles to fill up the future government with high-order
unifying symbols during this politically changing season.
This new cultural and normative grouping consists of
intelligentsia, journalists, eduationists, writers, social
workers, civically involved professionals such as lawyers,
doctors, engineer, and religious leaders and spokemen. Economic
change and growth in Hong Kong during the past three decades
have produced a more diversified and pluralistic class
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structure. A proliferating new middle class salaried
employees in non-manual occupations is the major source, though
not the exclusive one, of this symbolic specialists. Many of
them form themselves into pressure groups, political groups and
quasi-political groups. They are less utilitarianistic family
men than the others. They are well-educated, more
cosmopolitan, exposed to Western political ideas, especially
liberal democracy. Hence their political vocabulary is
informed heavily from exogenous political figures. systems and
ideas. Democracy and democratization are their positive
referent symbols. During this transitional period it is this
sector of the population which is most politicized. Taking
full advantage of the freedom of speech and expression. they
shape debates, raise agendas and introduce new categories which
were suppressed by depoliticization.
In the political context of Hong Kong, the democratic
elites are distinct from others (including the capitalist and
the mass) in the following two closely-related aspects:
(1) They have extra political demands and standards
expressed and expressible by high-order symbols. While people
still expect liberty, they come to demand 'democracy". Whilst
people need more than quantitative and pragmatic benefits from
the political system, they come to anticipate a higher level of
affective political gratification articulated by abstract
symbols, holding values beyond the pursuit of immediate self-
interest. They advance" electoral democracy instead of
government by consultation." popular sovereignty' instead of
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"meritocracy, accountability more than efficiency, public
monitoring more than bureaucratic confidentality, and
legislative control than executive domination.
The fundamental deficiency of an administrative polity is
precisely its incapacity to cultivate the integrative meaning
and social morality necessary for bridging individual interests
and public concern. It cannot implant transcendental symbols
unifying various members and classes of a society. The
Government's insistence on the saliency of formally constitued
law and procedures (legalism and formalism) in recent years.
though leading Hong Kong to a more rational society. has left
the moral and sentimental vacuum basically untouched. The
democratic elites reject and demystify the norms that have
determined the exercise of the colonial power--
administerization of politics, conservatism, anti-
intellectualism, empiricism, and a preference for
incrementalism. To the public an administrative polity may
bring efficiency. To the new elites. they deplore that in a
nonparticipant polity. bureaucratic definitions of social
problems is frequently based on narrow concepts stripped of
broad political and societal meanings and solutions are
conceived in administrative term. Such pragmatism and myopia.
they believe, would not breed diffuse, affective support from
the people as in a participatory society.
All these bring uneasiness to the net elites. Their
restlessness is given an opportune release by the political
change in Hong Kona. They are prompted by the 19971 issue and
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the Green Paper on Representative Government. Both incidents
re-ignited their suspicion and distrust toward the
undemocratic system and an aspiration for democracy. They
are cued, aroused and encouraged by the slogan of the PRC
authorities' Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong, and by the Hong
Kong Government's promise of a more accountable and
reoresentative system firmly rooted in Hong Kong. They
employ their critical skill to analyze the political, moral and
culture inadequacies of the present system, use their
theorectical knowledge to fabricate unorthodox alternatives,
and engage their verbal skill to dramatize their definition of
possibility.
(2) They manifest a rising political culture. It is one
of political collectivisation, consciousness. efficacy,
concern, optimism, and activism, as against the usual
privatisation, impotence, indifference, fear, alienation.
realism, and passivism of the public's. I n a word, they
endeavour to reclaim the initiative to define the futurity of
Hong Kong by Hong Kona people.29
As Lau and Kuan demonstrate. local population have an
3O
inclination to individualize public issue. Leung echoed this
egocentric feature:
There is seldom any principle of public concern,
any ideology, or any detailed consideration of the
objective specific government policy3
But symbolization and symbols are crucial ability and tools For
high-level political debate, grievance and dissent. In Hona
Kona the level of nolitical discourse was barred from an
elevated level, since high-order symbols and categories havin
collectivization (politicization) effects were generally absen
in the daily vocabulary of the common people. Under a colonia
constitution and the fear of China's menace
democratization, representative government. political
party. direct election, political accountability etc were
strict taboos. Moreover, a nonparticipant polity has deprived
the people of an opportunity to get acquainted with a
particular thinking necessary for collective actions and
concerns. As Lau recognizes:
Under these Cnonparticipant] culture themes. the
Hong Kong Chinese are handicapped from thinking in
terms which transcend the immediate and paraochial
confines of themselves and their familial groups.
In general, the Hong Kong Chinese are prone to
think in concrete, piecemeal and short-term ways,
relating to things which are directly and
immediately experienced and which affect their
individual and familial interests. They are not
I | . • • » . • _ • |
common interests, as this would require them to
take into consideration a large bulk of
information on different sectors of society and at
different levels of abstraction. couch them in
such a long-term perspective, and to balance them
in such a way that the long-term interests of each
sector will be best served. In addition, this
kind of thinking will demand the gorging of
logical and empirical linkages among the disparate
elements qoing into the reasoning and
.
cnnceotualizma process.
But this kind of thinking is not possible without acquiring
appropriate linguistic skills, vocabulary and symbols through
training, learning and practising. A participant language is
inevitably one with abstract, condensational symbols in a
modern. comDlicated society. Symbols transcends citizens' at-
hand immediacies of the everyday life to a conceptualized
understanding of and affective involvement with the political
environment at various levels—from policies and policy issues.
political institutions, structure, to the constitution, and
from the individual, family, society to the political community
as a whole.
Cognitively, if you cannot speak the language you cannot
participate in the process of politics. To be more precise,
the level of language and symbols we can use reflects and
determines the level of our political involvement,
participation and identification. A man in the street may feel
deep grievances about his situation in life and yet be unable
to relate such grievance with any comprehensive socio-politica]
criticism. In Lipsitz analogy, a man may be able to tell yoi
that the shoe pinches but may have a difficult time figurine
out exactly where and why, how things got that way, how the
pinching is related to the structure of the shoe, and what he
can do about it. In Hong Kong, people's awareness of existing
channels of communication for administrative grievances with
the government is low, not to mention high-level political
inputs. Only 30% of the people were aware of the District
Board and the City District Office as communication media;
over half of respondents reported that the government was too
complicated for them to understand. Consequently, the
Government continues to be a monolithic enigma in people s
perception. Affectively, the atomist political culture plus a
historical absence of civic education has channelled the
detached political attitude of the people to a point of no
return. Their pragmatic interest in society has not been
converted to a high level of sympathetic involvement in or
identification with the society and the political system.
The democratic elites, on the other hand, have the
symboli2ation taste and ability. Their mastery of symbols
enables themselves to articulate their political interests, tc
transcend their political demand into a higher level of
normative principle, to generate an alternate definition of
possibility. and to constitute preconditions for
repoliticization. They tend to deprivatized public issue,
conceive the future as relevant to their collective destinies.
Their basic divide with the capitalist centres around the
understanding and emotive attachment to the symbol democracy.
Granted the significance of prosperity and stability, they
find reasons for believing that it would not be imperiled by
one-man-one-vote. In a meeting with the visiting Chinese
delegation in January 1986, Dr Edward Chan, a local economist,
told that democracy and economic development in a
capitalism was not necessarily incompatible. In his words:
I don' t think that our prosperity in the past
mainly resulted from a lack of democracy in our
system. Along the same line, we can't project
that future democracy would lead to
instability in the economy.
Hhile the capitalist class shows distrust to the Hong
Kong people, democratic advocates extend deep diffidence on
the integrity and commitment of the upper stratum to rule Hong
Kong after 1997. They are outraged by those capitalists who
try to sabotage the use of democracy with negative
connotations. As one journalist writes.
Even more depression is. trajhj. son des_
nam tal istas. the sell-out by so many of
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Hongkong's richest entrepreneurs... They persuade
Peking that they equate democracy, even
representative government, with excessive wage
levels, strikes and lox productivity --in
short, a welfare state which they characterise
as the free lunch. They dismiss the enormous
common sense that the mass of the people of
Hongkong have demonstrated over the past three
decades and the debt that they (literally) owe to
the common sense3g
Summary
The emergence of the democratic elites is intensified by a
creation of a political market. Political change results in a
socio-political dislocation which triggers off a politicization
process. The new elites further politicize and complicate the
present situation by formulating and urging their conception of
the political future to be filled up with ideological.
intellectual and moral questions. Prosperity and stability
based on capitalism cannot satiate their lofty -demands.
Democratization is the focal point of their alternative
symbolic mission, which is a vehicle symbol from and through
which to mould and express their political activism and
idealism. Hong Kong people have been monopolized by one
province of meaning--economism. They have been excluded from
seeking values and meanings in the political realm. The new
elites would like to see it to extend its membership to the
people at large. but it is interpreted by the capitalist as a
class menace.
5. CONCLUSION—SYMBOLIC CONSENSUS CUM POLITICAL CULTURI
IN HONG KONG
A symbolic consensus is here defined as a situation iihere
a political symbol winning common subscription from different
groups of people. with or irithout substantive agreement on its
exact cognitive meaning. Because of the political change, Honcr
Kong is said to have entered a period of politicization,
which can be perceived as a stage when parties offer various
definitions of reality and futurity. So Hong Kong is urged to
1
search for a new consensus. A successful appeal to the
various sectors of the population for a symbolic consensus is
politically and socially significant:
A seeming consensus which is accepted at its face
value is far better than no consensus—and a
seeming consensus is sometimes reflected in
loyalty to the same symbols even though they carry
different meanings. A sense of homogeneity is
often an efficient substitute for the fact of
homogeneity.
In Hong Kong, capitalists. the PRC' s Government, the Hong
Kong Government and the new elites continue to subscribe to
prosperity and stability. But the symbol means different
specific things to different parties. Each has a somewhat
different interpretations of the symbol. different emphases
around the key-sign, and different perceptions of the means to
achieve it.
As we have seen in last chapter. capitalists mean the
symbol as a retention of the present social, economic and
political systems. Democratization and direct election are
envisaged as risky deviations from it. Chinese leaders,
placing more value on economic contribution they secure from
Hong Kong, converge more with capitalists' interpretation?
Hhen they endorse tiro systems in one country, the systems
are economic systems--socialism and capitalism--rather than
political systems. As a matter of fact, Chinese officials and
their local delegates have warned against the making of an
independent political entity in Hong Kong. reminding that
(o
Hong Kong is a part of the great motherland. Therefore.
Chinese leaders' version of prosperity and stability has to
be understood in connection with their nationalistic.
national sovereignty's mentality. In stressing the
maintanence of the authority of her governance before July 1,
- 1997 and that she must not be turned into a lamb duck, the
Hong Kong Government and her ruling elites stick to their usual
gradualist and consensual approach. Appealing to the
harmonious Chinese culture. Ms Lydia Dunn, the Senior
Unofficial Member of the Legislative Councial, called on her
colleagues to find unity in diversity in the opening of the
new Council Chamber last year:
If a house be divided against itself, that house
cannot stand.
The new elites agree that prosperity and stability
should mean the preservation of the existing social and
economic lifestyles. but lobby the people that direct
election is the only guarantee for all that freedom we nor
en-joy® They do not stop at a symbolic consensus. They need to
hammer out an affective consensus on democracy, as ;
prerequisite to knead a collective identity, impla nt a more
C
sense of belonging and lessen the personalization traits.
Nevertheless, their democratic canvassing suffers from ?
unfavourable culture context.
In other parts of the world governments and political
figures are able to use democratic symbols and activities to
rationalize their decisions and to mobilize public support or
quiescence. But in Hong Kong, democratic symbols and
activities have been out of context. To reiterate, the genuine
hypnotic effect of provocative and reassuring symbols demand a
cultural context. In Western states, for example, the
effective use of democratic rhetoric works itself within a
participatory political culture, whereas the escapist,
pragmatic, and paternalistic political culture in Hong Kong,
reinforced by the brand of secluded politics, has spared the
people from high-brow appeals by democratic terms and
1°
activities.
Certainly, a certain degree of remoteness constitutes
the precondition for the expressive use of symbols in which
leaders can evoke a quiescent or an aroused mass response
merely by their strong character or their devoted gesture.
i i hflpal. states, their citizens at large find it
more interesting and worthwhile in other activities than
politics. For them. politics is a mediated world of indirect,
experiences placed by television news. newspapers. and
m3gazines. They do not participate in passing laws in
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Congress, in making foreign policies, in updating national
budget, and they seldom run as candidates for election. They
are aware of distant politics because they are introduced
through political language and symbolic activities. For the
remote public, politics is just a passing parade of abstract
11•
symbols. Firsthand information and constant and direct
checking of it is either rare or impossible or both. And they
are reassured when their politicians subtly identify themselves
and their policies with the sacrosanct vocabulary of the
political culture. Equally, they. feel they are participating
in politics when they are posted a party manifesto, mark their
ballot paper occasionally, or just see their national emblem.
In Hong Kong, the fact is that the people are just too
affectively alienated from the political system. Public trust
is hard to establish. The extent of affective remoteness has
persisted for such a long span of time that the communicability
and receptivity of democratic vocabulary and symbols are
deprived of their political-cultural sedimentation. In such a
nonparticipant polity, the people are so existentially distant
from politics that high-sounding symbols will be received
with coolness or even skepticism. This scenario is fully
grasped by Ms Dunn as she voices it without reservation:
The people of Hong Kong... are not doctrinaire.
They are practical people. They view politics
with the greatest scepticism. They will be
looking for results and they will judge us by
result 1=
In the 1985 district board election. the electorate still
tended to personalize politics, emphasize the personal
attributes of the candidates and pay heed only to the kinds of
57
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material and concrete goods they can be expected to deliver.
Propagandizing to such an electorate, the candidates scarcely
mentional national issues such as political reform. the
future of Hong Kong and so on in their platforms.
In order to be more approachable to the people, the
democratic elites also profess allegiance to the symbol, of
prosperity and stability. But at this point they edge alone a
critical threshold. What they are doing is striking an uneasy
balance between a supposedly sacred mission for democrac' and
a secularized concern for prosperity and stabilty. The
balance is uneasy since an unfledged democracy is easily
absorbed into the latter whose artificial divinity is
almost invincible and inviolable at the present moment. At
that time they will remain captive to the capitalist, the local
bureaucrat, the communist and the people. Their participation
will be cooptation, and their urged democratization will turn
ritualized.
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